| By Charles F. Hawkins
霍金斯（华盛顿）
It is difficult to understand the reasoning of Beijing's leaders sometimes. The passage of China's anti-secession law on March 14, 2005 is one of these times.
Specifically targeted at Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province, the anti-secession law codifies what people have known for a long time: that China will use “non-peaceful means”if it sees fit to do so in order to unify mainland China and Taiwan, and prevent Taiwan independence.
As we all know,“non-peaceful means”is a euphemism for “going to war.”China won't renounce the use of force to unify with Taiwan if Taiwan declares independence.
So why does Beijing want to use legal language to make its point now? One reason is that Beijing wants to mitigate the rhetorical effects of Taiwan's referendum on constitutional change, something that Beijing fears would lead to an effective declaration of independence by Taiwan's voters.
A second reason for the anti-aecession law is that Beijing is trying to shape the international environment by putting into a legal framework its position on unification with Taiwan and under what circumstances it is prepared to use force to achieve this end.
In this regard, the anti-secession law is similar to a United Nations' resolution: it's all bark and no bite unless the promulgating authority decides to enforce it.
Another reason for enacting the anti-secession law is to serve notice to the United States and Japan that China considers relations with Taiwan an internal matter and that it won't book any interference by outside powers.
Although no one believes that the United States won't defend Taiwan if China attacks it, enactment of the law makes sense from a Chinese political and diplomatic
perspective.
A fourth and very important reason for passing anti-secession legislation at this time is strictly internal. In making Taiwan unification the centrepiece of the NPC's March legislative duties the Chinese Communist Party is elevating awareness in China of the importance of the Taiwan issue, and doing so in a way that is calculated to firm up popular support.
It remains to be seen, however, the extent to which popular support can be assured by the passage of the anti-secession law. Informal polls indicate that many mainland Chinese are not enthusiastic about going to war over Taiwan, and even less so if they know losses will be suffered.
In one instance a university poll on the question of going to war over Taiwan was suppressed by the central government because the results showed that a majority of those polled did not support war under any circumstances.
Wang Zhaoguo, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, argues that the anti-secession law “conforms to the will of our people,” without, apparently, considering the will of 23 million Taiwanese, most of whom prefer the status quo to either independence from or unification with the mainland.
Wang's legislative draft says that“historic opportunity for common development and common prosperity of the two sides of the Straits will be lost, the interests and welfare of the Taiwan compatriots will be ruined and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation will suffer damage”if the law is not enacted.
In fact, the opposite is true. Taiwan's de facto independence for the past 55 years has benefited both Taiwan and mainland China in multiple and very generous ways.
Economically, both Taiwan and China have grown robust and strong in the intervening years since the end of civil war hostilities. The “interests and welfare”of Taiwan people do not seem to have suffered, no more than the “fundamental interests of the Chinese nation”have suffered as a result of current conditions.
For example, trade between China and Taiwan today, and foreign direct investment by Taiwan with China are at an all-time high.
Occasionally, Chinese interlocutors like to use the American Civil War (1861-1865) as an analogy to China-Taiwan. Chinese President Hu Jintao used this analogy to US reporters during his vice presidential visit to US President George Bush in 2002.
The analogy with the American Civil War is dubious at best. Northern and southern states had many years of common history and a depth of political integration that China and Taiwan do not have, and even if the right of a territory's inhabitants to self-determination were not absolute, in the case of Taiwan it would seem to outweigh Beijing's claim to ownership.
But I agree with my friend: “Peaceful solution is the best means.”In the end, the contest is about ownership and, ultimately, control. When discussing the China-Taiwan issue with students at Beijing's Foreign Affairs University last year, I asked to what extent it would be possible for Taiwan's people to vote for their own future under a unification scenario.
One student stood up immediately and objected, saying, “But then China couldn't control Taiwan!”
That pretty much sums up what the anti-secession law is all about.
The writer is a senior defence analyst in Washington, D.C.and a frequent visitor to Asia. He contributes this article to Lianhe Zaobao. | 
发表于 2005-3-20 04:53
